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The purpose of this article is to explore a certain method of judi-
cial reasoning and its implications regarding the practice of judicial
review. Taking the Court's police power, Commerce Clause, and
modern substantive due process jurisprudence as examples, I argue
that the Court uses prototypes to restrict the scope of constitutional
categories in order to implement perceived constitutional values. I
further argue that this prototype-based reasoning is best seen as im-
plementing the Constitution out of concern about legislative pretext
and the need to create limits on governmental power, rather than as
specifying the exact content of the Constitution.
In the three areas mentioned, the Court has asked questions such
as whether an activity is sufficiently harmful' or affected with the pub-
2.
lic interest to allow regulation, whether an activity is economic, or
whether a constitutional right to privacy is broad enough to protect
an activity. 4 Using insights into human categorization, I argue that
. J.D., 2006, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Professor Frank
Goodman, Professor Kermit Roosevelt, Emily Saslow, and Justin Engel for their help on earlier
drafts of this article. I would also like to thank my parents, James and Karen Falcone, for their
unwavering support. All errors are mine.
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) ("It seems to us that the real object
and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employ6s
(all being men, suijuris), in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any
real and substantial degree, to the health of the employ6s.").
2 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876) (concluding that a state law limiting
rates charged by grain warehouses is valid since grain storage is clothed with the public inter-
est).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 613 (2000) (explaining that the non-
economic, criminal nature of possession of a firearm was central to the holding in Lopez and
applying the Lopez test to invalidate a provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that a federal statute criminalizing possession
of a firearm within a school zone did not regulate economic activity and therefore exceeded
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).
' See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating a regulation
forbidding the use of contraceptives as applied to married persons because the marital relation-
ship is within a zone of privacy created by various constitutional guarantees).
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the scope of constitutional limitations in these areas involves a choice
between hewing to a category's most prototypical examples or ac-
knowledging the graded nature of the category and ceding its control
to the legislature. For example, whether an activity is commercial can
be decided by a court according to its notion of commercial activity
in order to maintain the constitutional value of a limited federal gov-
ernment or the choice can be ceded to a legislature to be made ac-
cording to its view of what actually affects commerce.
Besides having positive value in explaining the Court's reasoning,
the analysis that follows supports the view that the Court's rulings in
the police power, Commerce Clause, and modern substantive due
process contexts do not specify the exact content of the Constitution
6but instead provide rules of decision for courts. If the form of judi-
cial decisions in these areas follows from how the Court uses catego-
ries a priori to create bounds on legislative power, then the decisions
have as much to do with categorical reasoning as with the content of
the Constitution. While this is not an endorsement of popular consti-
tutionalism or departmentalism, it undermines a view opposed to
these philosophies: that the Court simply applies the law and thatju-
dicial constitutional interpretation is "law" whereas non-judicial in-
terpretation is not.
At the outset, it is important to note what I do not argue. I do not
argue that any newly-discovered secrets of the human brain dictate
the outcome of any cases. Nor do I attack specific areas of jurispru-
dence, for example, by condemning the Lochner Court as illegitimate
while praising the Carolene Products paradigm as enlightened. In fact,
my point is the opposite: that the Court, whether liberal or conserva-
tive, purposefully constructs constitutional categories to protect per-
ceived constitutional values.
Part I will explain relevant insights into human categorization
from linguistics and other sciences. Part II will show how these in-
sights can explain three main areas of the Supreme Court's modern
jurisprudence: the Commerce Clause cases, the police power cases,
5 See infra Part II.B.
6 For recent work examining the distinction between the Constitution's meaning and its
judicial enforcement, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001)
(surveying different constitutional theories in light of their status as tools for implementing the
Constitution); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (describ-
ing how a distinction between the Constitution's content and its judicial enforcement is useful
in explaining various areas of the Court's jurisprudence); and Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitu-
tional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REv. 1649 (2005) (arguing
against the conclusion that the Court's decisions in key areas specify the content of the Consti-
tution). For an influential discussion of the distinction, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Statu.s of Underenforced Constitutional Nors, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing that
there are areas where the Supreme Court has refused to enforce a provision to its full concep-
tual boundaries due to institutional concerns).
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and the Griswold line of substantive due process cases. Part III will
conclude with an examination of the normative implications of this
account.
I. COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AND LEGAL CATEGORIES
Before turning to the case law, it would be helpful to begin with
an explanation of what I mean by "prototype-based" or "categorical"
reasoning. As I will explain more fully in this section, a prototype is a
"best" example of a category. 7 I use categorical reasoning to refer to
the way people categorize, or group, things and concepts.
Drawing on the literature about human categorization, I hope to
establish in this section three basic points about categorical reasoning
that will aid later discussion: categories are graded, purposeful, and
not fully declarative." The classical view was that categories were de-
fined by necessary and sufficient conditions, with all members of a
category sharing common properties and belonging equally to the
category.9 In the mid-twentieth century, insights from fields and sub-
fields as diverse as anthropology,"' psychology," philosophy, 2 and
mathematics' s began to collapse the classical notion of categories.
14
7 See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MIND 7 (1987). For this discussion, I draw heavily on Lakoffs work because it is
thorough and accessible.
8 While this account differs in its main emphases, readers interested in cognitive science
and its application to law should refer to Steven L. Winter's 2001 book, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND, and to a Brooklyn Law Review symposium on Winter's book, Sym-
posium, Cognitive Legal Studies: Categorization and Imagination in the Mind of the Law, 67 BROOK.
L. REV. 941 (2002). A summary of the literature on categorization and law can be found in
Ronald Chen &Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and
Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004).
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARKJOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND
ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 9 (1999) (describing this classical view).
0 See, e.g., BRENT BERLIN & PAUL KAY, BASIC COLOR TERMS: THEIR UNIVERSALITY AND
EVOLUTION 7-10 (1969) (detailing research showing that different societies use the same basic
color categories, like red and blue, regardless of whether each society's language has words for
each of the basic colors).
I See, e.g., COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978)
(surveying scholarship on the nature of human category formation); see also infra Part I.
12 For example, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that categories have family
resemblances, with members being similar along a variety of dimensions but not necessarily
sharing all of the same common properties. See LUDWIG WrITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 31-32 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953).
13 See, e.g., L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8 INFO. AND CONTROL 338 (1965) (postulating fuzzy set
theory to explain categories such that members can belong to a category to some degree).
Turning the tables, George Lakoff and Rafael Nufiez have used insights from cognitive science
to explain mathematics. See GEORGE LAKOFF & RAFAEL E. NUNEZ, WHERE MATHEMATICS COMES
FROM: HOW THE EMBODIED MIND BRINGS MATHEMATICS INTO BEING (2000).
14 See LAKOFF, supra note 7, at 11-57 for a description of these advances and their implica-
tions.
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A. Categories are Graded
Categories are graded; that is, they are not defined by necessary
and sufficient conditions but have members that fit the categories
well and others that fit less well.
A famous legal example is explored in H.L.A. Hart's discussion of
a law banning vehicles from a park.15 It is clear that such a law would
ban automobiles but unclear whether it also bans bicycles, airplanes,
or roller-skates. 16 Hart noted that legal rules often are indeterminate;
they have an "open texture," with some applications more clearly
covered by a rule than others.
7
To take a non-legal example, a famous series of experiments by
the psychologist Eleanor Rosch illustrates the mental reality of
graded categories marked by prototype effects. 18  Rosch found that
subjects identified robins (but not penguins) as prototypical birds
and desk chairs (but not rocking chairs) as prototypical chairs. Rosch
used measures that included direct ratings of a member's fit in a
category, the response time for identifying whether a statement like
"a penguin is a bird" is true, and what examples subjects would give if
asked to list members of a category.' 9 Central or prototypical mem-
bers, like robins, often possessed the main attributes of the group.2 O
They also had stronger ratings for fit, elicited shorter response times,
and were more often included in lists of category members. 2' Rosch's
insight was that people seem to have graded internal representations
of categories: members of categories are more or less central. Un-
15 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123-25 (1961).
16 See id. Arguably, Hart and cognitive scientists share Wittgenstein's influence. See LAKOFF,
supra note 7, at 16-18 (describing the influence of Wittgenstein's notion of the concept of a
game on the evolution of modern thinking on categories); Frederick Schauer, (Re)taking Hart,
119 HARv. L. REv. 852, 861 n.26 (2006) (reviewing NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE
NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004)) (noting that Hart's account of the open texture of
law in The Concept of Law relied heavily on the work of F.M. Waismann, one of Wittgenstein's
disciples).
HART, supra note 15, at 124.
18 For a summary of Rosch's work on categories, see LAKOFF, supra note 7, at 39-55. The
term "prototype effects" refers to the fact that some members are considered "more representa-
tive of [a] category than other[s]." Id. at 41. In her later work, Professor Rosch concluded that
the prototype effects described in her experiments related to mental representations but that
there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the two. Id. at 43.
19 Id. at 41-42. There were other interesting findings in this area: for example, subjects be-
lieved that a disease was more likely to spread from robins to ducks than from ducks to robins,
leading to the conclusion that new information about a representative category member is
more likely to be generalized to nonrepresentative members than vice versa. Id. at 42.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 41.
22 The underlying mental representations that produce prototype effects have various
names, including frames, schemas, and scripts. Lakoff uses the term "idealized cognitive mod-
els." LAKOFF, supra note 7, at 68.
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der this account, central or prototypical members of a category are
often the standard by which other members are judged, and they are
most strongly associated with the category.
B. Categories are Purposive
Categories are often constructed with a specific purpose in mind.
Whether one's use of categories is "right" depends upon one's goals.
For example, there is really no such thing as a fish, biologically
speaking.23 This may be counterintuitive or even pointless with re-
spect to our daily lives: a thing is a fish because the category label
serves our purposes by helping to distinguish its taste and appear-
ance. However, based on evolutionary links, some so-called fish, like
lungfish, are actually much more closely related to land-dwelling
creatures like reptiles, mammals, and birds than to other fish.24 In
one important respect, genetic make-up, lungfish are not fish at all.
At the very least, there is no unitary concept of fish. Neither the ge-
netic categorization nor the folk understanding is right or wrong in
any absolute sense but each may be more or less useful to the evolu-
tionary biologist, the fisherman, or the restaurant patron. Categories
and their underlying representations are not right or wrong but more
or less apt in relation to one's goals.
In fact, people often construct categories in an ad hoc manner,
based on their purpose at a particular time. Categories like "what to
do for entertainment on a weekend" are constructed (just as legal
categories are), but they nonetheless exhibit prototype effects. 5 This
kind of category is ad hoc and is understood in relation to an indi-
vidual's goals.
Categories are also determined by our purposes in the broader
sense of the term. For example, Douglas Medin and Gregory Murphy
argue that human categorization is underdetermined by similarity:
categories are instead determined by individuals' theories about the
world.26
23 Id. at 119 (citing STEPHENJAY GOULD, HEN'S TEETH AND HORSE'S TOES 363-64 (1983)).
24 Id. (citing GOULD, supra note 23, at 363-64).
25 See generally Lawrence W. Barsalou, Ad Hoc Categories, 11 MEMORY & COGNITION 211 (1983)
(studying the similarities and differences between ad hoc categories, which, like "weekend en-
tertainment," are categories that are consciously constructed for a purpose, and common cate-
gories, such as "fruit" and "dogs."). Barsalou concludes that, despite their differences, both ad
hoc, purposive categories and common categories demonstrate prototype effects. Id. at 216.
See Gregory L. Murphy & Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92
PSYCHOL. REv. 289, 313 (1985) (concluding that categories are coherent to the extent that they
match individuals' background knowledge or theories about the world). As an illustrative ex-
ample, Murphy and Medin note that in the Book of Leviticus, the Bible lists unclean animals,
whose status as unclean is determined not by similarity to other clean or unclean animals but by
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C. Categories are not Fully Declarative
While goal-related, categories are not fully declarative. By this I
mean two related things: first, that we often categorize automatically
and unconsciously and, second, that we do not necessarily have an
explicit theory to explain our categorizations. For example, we can
understand that penguins are not the best example of a bird or judge
when someone is telling a lie 27 more or less automatically. Moreover,
we do so without necessarily possessing an accurate and explicit the-
ory of what constitutes a bird or a lie.
The fact that categories are not fully declarative means that they
can impart more meaning in a narrative or legal argument than is
immediately apparent. To borrow a phrase from Anthony Amster-
dam and Jerome Bruner, one's categories are "rarely innocent":
28
they can make something seem a real and natural phenomenon,
rather than an artificial construction of the world.29 Amsterdam and
Bruner examine the concept of dual fatherhood in Michael H. v. Ge-
rald D., ° a case that involved a biological father' seeking to establish
paternity and thus visitation rights to his child. Justice Scalia, writing
for the plurality, stated that "California law, like nature itself, makes
no provision for dual fatherhood."s2 Amsterdam and Bruner describe
Justice Scalia's concept of the natural family as the "conceptual and
narrative engine" for the case." The "natural" family allowed.|ustice
Scalia to frame the plaintiff as an aggressor on the familial relation-
ship who is not entitled to a due process visitation right because his-
torical tradition protects the unitary and traditional family as op-
posed to a non-traditional, biological one.34 In fact, Lakoff argues
that there is no unitary model of parenthood; there are several
whether each animal fits with its habitat, structure, and form of movement; the ostrich is thus
unclean because it has feathers but cannot fly. Id. at 312-13.
27 See LAKOFF, supra note 7, at 71 (detailing three conditions for a lie: a false belief, an inten-
tion to deceive, and actual factual falsity). When test subjects are asked to define a lie, they
point to factual falsity, but when subjects are asked to judge whether a hypothetical example
satisfies the conditions for being a lie, factual falsity is the least important condition. Id. at 71-
73.
28 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw 35 (2000).
29 Id. at 44.
I0 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
3 Blood tests showed that the plaintiff, Michael H., had a 98.07% probability of paternity.
Id. at 114. The child was the product of an adulterous relationship between Michael H. and the
child's mother. Despite plaintiff's biological relation to the child, defendant Gerald D. was
listed on the birth certificate as the father because he was married to the mother at the time of
conception and birth.
22 Id. at 118.
3 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 28, at 81.
34 See id. at 103.
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dominant submodels.5 The unexamined use of categories as if they
are natural and inevitable can give judicial opinions a sense of logical
entailment that makes it seem as if the Court is simply reading the
law. In sum, categories and their underlying representations appear
to be graded and marked by prototype effects, which are driven by
the purposes and beliefs of their users and are not fully declarative.
II. ON MINDING LIMITS
The Court's police power, Commerce Clause, and modern sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence all demonstrate the features de-
scribed above: the categories the Court employs are graded, pur-
poseful, and not fully declarative: They make good examples
35 For example, while there is a prototypical concept of a mother, there are also many sub-
models for which we have labels, including the stepmother, the adoptive mother, the natural
mother, the unwed mother, the foster mother, the surrogate mother, and the genetic mother.
LAKOFF, supra note 7, at 83. While Amsterdam and Bruner do not mention Lakoff's discussion
of submodels for parenthood, it adds a nice touch to their point.
Cass Sunstein cites LAKOFF, supra note 7, in relation to the idea that the Lochner era en-
trenched the common law as a neutral base-line. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 504 & n.386 (1987) (citing Lakoff for the proposition that
"normative commitments are built into [our] language"); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 903 & n.148 (1987) (citing Lakoff for the proposition that Lochner-like
"premises are built into our language"). I suspect Professor Sunstein means that legal catego-
ries are socially constructed but at the same time often seem natural.
37 Legal interest in categories on recent insights into categorization is focused elsewhere.
Scholars seem to focus on a single area of law or a specific case. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas,
Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
747 (2001) (drawing on categorization research to argue against a disparate impact standard
because bias is largely unconscious); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categoies: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995) (arguing the same); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 93, 146-49 (2002) (using Professor Winter's interpretation of the cognitive sci-
ence literature to examine the concept of property in takings doctrine). Reasoning by analogy
has attracted some attention. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in
Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197 (2001) (attempting to use cognitive science to explain analogical rea-
soning in law), but Professor Lakoff's work on metaphor seems to be the area that lawyers most
discuss. See, e.g., Adam Arms, Metaphor, Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS WArOMEN'S L.J. 257, 271-72
(1999) (drawing on Professors Lakoff andJohnson's insights into metaphor to describe how the
"bundle of sticks" and "grasped thing" metaphors for property can harm women's interests by
helping to deny them the results of intangible assets owned by their ex-husbands, such as the
monetary rewards of advanced professional degrees that their husbands earned while married);
Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor
Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004) (describing
how lawyers can use cognitive science's understanding of metaphor to improve their legal ar-
guments); Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 807, 815-16 (1993)
(describing how seemingly inconsistent decisions about boycotts follow from differing concep-
tions of boycotts themselves). Lakoffs hypothesis regarding metaphors is that many of our
higher-order concepts derive their content from experiences in the physical domain. Thus, we
understand arguments as conflicts and speak of them in terms of defending oneself, demolish-
ing the enemy, having weak points, etc. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
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because they are second nature to a reader with legal training and
they help define the scope of governmental power.
Scholars have engaged in a lively debate about the proper way to
interpret certain provisions of the Constitution. Should constitu-
tional interpretation be based on the original historical understand-
ing,8 the moral principles a provision embodies,39 the structure of the
Constitution,40 the nature of the federal government, 41 or an aspira-
tional content that invites each successive generation to fill in the
content of provisions? 42 Are there general principles that the Consti-
tution embodies, such as a concern with processes for protecting lib-
erty rather than with specific substantive protections3 or a ban on fa-
voring one group over another?44  My account of categorization
complicates these questions. I argue that the Court concerns itself
with protecting perceived constitutional values via its categorizations
rather than with directly implementing constitutional provisions or
inquiring into questions of text or moral principle. 5
LIVRE By 4 (1980). Sometimes with collaborators, Lakoff has applied such analyses to western
philosophy, see LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note 9, mathematics, see LAKOFF & NUNEZ, supra note
13, and political beliefs, see GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK (2002).
." See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that constitutional interpreters
should seek "the original meaning of the text").
39 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 2 (1996) ("The moral reading proposes that
we all-judges, lawyers, citizens-interpret and apply these abstract [rights-granting] clauses on
the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice."); Mi-
chael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 135 (1989) (argu-
ing for a moral realist interpretation under the theory that the founders used "brief and general
language" to refer to values whose nature would guide constitutional interpretation).
0 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (arguing that
constitutional interpreters should read contested constitutional words and phrases in light of
similar words and phrases found elsewhere in the document).
41 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK,JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29
(1969) (arguing for "a wider use of inference from relation and [national] structure in the in-
tellectual processes of constitutional law").
42 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 38, at
65, 70 (arguing that the Framers "launched [the Constitution] upon a historic voyage of inter-
pretation in which succeeding generations.., would elaborate what the text means in ways all
but certain not to remain static.").
43 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88-101 (1980) (arguing that the Con-
stitution is dedicated to concerns of process and structure, as opposed to protecting specific
substantive values).
44 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1710-14
(1984) (arguing that a key constitutional value is a ban on preferencing one group over an-
other for a non-public purpose).
45 Fallon similarly takes extant theories of constitutional interpretation as his foil to argue
that the Court implements the Constitution, but he does so by emphasizing the need for the
Court to employ its practical judgment in implementing the Constitution. See FALLON, supra
note 6, at 4 (arguing that "the Justices frequently must function as practical lawyers and, in that
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Specifically, the insights that legal categories are graded, defined
by the purposes of their users, and not fully declarative explain the
reasoning behind the Court's often conclusory language in its police
power, Commerce Clause, and modern substantive due process juris-
prudence: the Court chooses to limit a category to its most proto-
typical meaning or to recognize the full reach of a category, which to
some extent really is intuitive. At the same time, its notion of limits is
driven by a desire to maintain other norms like individual liberty,
such that it cannot admit the full possible meaning of some legal
categories.
Consider this statement from Chief.Justice Charles Evans Hughes,
in a case challenging the New Deal Court's expansive notion of the
commerce power:
Whatever terminology is used, the criterion is necessarily one of degree
and must be so defined. This does not satisfy those who seek for mathe-
matical or rigid formulas. But such formulas are not provided by the
great concepts of the Constitution such as "interstate commerce," "due
process," "equal protection." In maintaining the balance of the constitu-
tional grants and limitations, it is inevitable that we should define their
46
applications in the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion.
Chief Justice Hughes suggests that categories are graded-not de-
fined by formulas but open to change by actors over time. He also
seems to suggest that this process is not defined solely by the legal
categories themselves but involves the balancing of other grants and
limitations. As seen in the Commerce Clause and police power 4s
contexts, the Court will often limit regulatory power to certain cate-
gories and their prototypical examples to set an effective limit on
government.
Steven Winter suggests that courts employ legal categories so as to
make them realistic to their readers, often by arguing that new cases
are logically connected to existing precedent.49 The reasoning ap-
pears legitimate precisely because it responds to some of its readers'
conceptions. 50
Categorical reasoning was a marked practice of nineteenth-
century legal thinkers, a practice characterized as an effort to identify
role, must craft doctrines and tests that reflect judgments of constitutional meaning but are not
perfectly determined by it.").
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 467 (1938).
47 See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the Court's police powerjurisprudence.
48 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
49 WINTER, supra note 8, at 325-27.
50 Id.
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abstract principles that reflect objective truth. 5' This is perhaps the
common understanding of much of the Court's pre-New Deal eco-
nomic rights and Commerce Clause jurisprudence.52 However, as the
following discussion should make clear, in the somewhat disparate
areas of the Court's police power, Commerce Clause and substantive
due process jurisprudence, categorical reasoning lives, though per-
haps stripped of the authority bestowed by a belief in the objective
truth of categories.
53
In the description that follows of the Court's police power juris-
prudence, as well as in my descriptions of the Court's Commerce
Clause and modern substantive due process cases, I do not cover the
full complexity of the Court's motivations and the diversity within
each era's doctrines. This omission is intentional, as this article's
purpose is to explore broad trends in constitutional reasoning rather
than detailed doctrinal permutations.
A. From Lochner to Midkiff
The Lochner Court attempted to limit exercises of the police power
to certain prototypical uses, an effort at least partially motivated by a
desire to maintain substantive limits and by a fear of legislatures act-
54ing for pretextual reasons. The Court's shift away from these proto-
typical examples in the 1930s was marked by a lessened suspicion of
legislative pretexts and a willingness to allow legislatures to exercise
their power according to the full possible scope of the concept.
During the era named after Lochner v. New York,55 the Court struck
down legislation on the ground that it improperly interfered with the
right to liberty and property protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.56 The Court restricted the police power using a variety of cate-
51 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 5-6 (1998) (calling belief in the possibility of attaining
objective truth a "luxury" no longer enjoyed today).
Y2 See id. at 152-59.
53 Recognizing that legal categories do not reflect objective truth is not necessarily an un-
qualified good: Wiecek suggests that, despite the flaws in classical legal thinking, it at least of-
fered a comprehensive explanation of the law and the work of judges, providing a legitimacy
that the modern Court lacks. Id. at 251.
54 It is true that there is no police power provision in the Constitution and perhaps also true
that the Lochner Court was most concerned with the value of personal liberty (not the police
power as such). These two points are worth noting, but they do not change my analysis.
55 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state may "deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law"). Although this presents one view of Lochner era
jurisprudence, in recent years there have been a variety of arguments over Lochner's import and
intellectual roots. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERSJURISPRUDENCE (1993) (arguing that Lochner-erajuris-
prudence was actually dictated by a concern over legislation that unfairly singled out individuals
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gories, including the class of activities sufficiently dangerous to justify
regulation, emergency situations that necessitated regulation, and ac-
tivities affected by the public interest.57  The Court devised these
categories as limits and allowed regulation of only their prototypical
members so as to prevent state power from being unbounded. 58  For
example, the maximum hour legislation in Lochner could not be justi-
fied by reference to danger to the employees, either as employees or
as members of the general public, or by a need to regulate the
cleanliness of the shop. The danger to the employees could not be a
justification because then no trade or occupation would escape the
police power,54 nor could the law be upheld under the reasoning that
any law that makes one segment of the population healthier contrib-
utes to general public health because then any law regulating a pri-
vate business might be valid. Finally, improving the cleanliness of
the shop could not be a justification because, if it were, the state
would become a paterfamilias, regulating the conduct of all individu-
als. 6 ' The connection between the legislation and the legitimate use
of the police power was simply too "shadowy and thin"; the law could
not be upheld if the right of grown men to contract was to have
meaning.
At first, the Court's language seems to offer conclusions, not rea-
soning. The Lochner Court admits the possibility of gradience 63 but
instead chooses to rely on the "common" understanding of what is
for special treatment); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 36, at 874 (arguing that Lochner
entrenched the Court's notion of neutrality as a constitutional requirement); David Bernstein,
Lochner-Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,
92 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-13 (2003) (arguing against Professor Gillman's and Professor Sunstein's the-
ses).
57 See, e.g., Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 442
(1927) (holding that a state law limiting resale prices for tickets unconstitutionally interferes
with property rights); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876) (concluding that a state law lim-
iting rates charged by grain warehouses is valid because grain storage is clothed with the public
interest).
58 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 ("It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the
valid exercise of the police power by the state. There is no dispute concerning this general
proposition. Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and the legislatures
of the States would have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of
legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of the people; such legis-
lation would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be. The
claim of the police power would be a mere pretext-become another and delusive name for the
supreme sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from constitutional restraint.").
Id. at 60.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 62.
62 Id.
I d. at 59 ("In looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations, it may be
true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other trades, and is also
vastly more healthy than still others.").
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dangerous.i While it seems conclusory, such reasoning is sensible if
categories are somewhat intuitive: the activity is not dangerous
enough to warrant interference by the legislature, as determined by
the Court's own use of the concept. This kind of categorical reason-
ing is also within the Court's competence for a priori reasoning, as
opposed to making the validity of a statute turn on factual determina-
tions. Thus, the Court can limit regulation of dangerous activities to
prototypical examples of such activities, for example, mining, 5 with-
out a need for explicit fact-finding regarding the danger created by
such activities.66
The existence of only a shadowy and thin connection between the
maximum hour legislation and a legitimate purpose implies that it is
not a central case of the exercise of the police power. To protect its
notion of liberty, the Court seems willing to accept only central cases.
If the state's power really could reach any object, then private liberty
could be routinely trampled upon, violating the notion of limited
government.
67
The New Deal Court began to undermine the restriction to proto-
typical examples of these categories by favorable comparison to a
central case. For example, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
the Court upheld a Minnesota regulation allowing the postponement
of mortgage payments by identifying similarities between the facts of
Blaisdell and the facts of other cases in which the suspension of con-
tracts during times of physical disasters was allowed." The Court rea-
soned that if the power to temporarily suspend contracts exists for
physical disasters, then it should also exist for urgent public emer-
gencies caused by economic disasters. 9 Justice Sutherland's dissent
warned against eroding constitutional protections, contrasting the
potentially trivial effects of upholding one particular piece of legisla-
tion with the "far more serious and dangerous inroads upon the limi-
tations of the Constitution which are almost certain to ensue as a
CA See id. ("To the common understanding the trade of a baker has never been regarded as
an unhealthy one.").
See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (rejecting a due process challenge to a state law
regulating aspects of mine safety, including permissible work-day length).
That said, in other cases, the Court was more willing to accept explicit fact-finding. See,
e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (upholding
hour restrictions on railroad workers because of the danger of railroad malfunctions due to
errors by exhausted workers); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum
hours legislation for women due to their frail physical structure and the fact that such regula-
tions affect the well-being of women's offspring).
67 This is a conclusion, not reasoning: there are some limits on what the government will do
because of the felt duty of individual legislators to comply with the Constitution and the politi-
cal accountability created by regular elections.
68 290 U.S. 398, 439-40 (1934).
69 See id.
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consequence naturally following any step beyond the boundaries
fixed by that instrument."70
The Constitution as ajudicially enforced limit on certain exercises
of power was certainly gone because the Court, bolstered by its new
Roosevelt appointees, abandoned a substantive vision for enforcing
the liberty of contract and acknowledged the graded nature of its
categories for policing that boundary. For example, in Nebbia v. New
York,' the Court seemed to expand the doctrine of a business af-
fected with a public interest by precisely this method: the Court
stated that there was "no closed class or category of businesses af-
fected with a public interest," as the category was instead open to in-. 72
terpretation. The Court no longer seemed interested in enforcing
its distinctions, and this acknowledgment of the graded nature of
categories was part of the rationale for abandoning them. By United
States v. Carotene Products,73 the Court's expanded vision of the police
power led it to uphold legislation that could be classified as the pat-
ent preferencing of a special interest without a corresponding public
benefit.1
4
A broad description of the scope of the police power 75 occurred in
Berman v. Parker6 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkff77 both casesunder the Takings Clause where the Court equated the state's power
70 Id. at 448 (Sutherland,J., dissenting).
71 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
72 Id. at 536.
73 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (holding that a Congressional Act banning the interstate ship-
ment of filled milk-skimmed milk compounded with fat or oil other than milk fat-did not
violate the Fifth Amendment).
71 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Stoy ofCarolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 397, 398 (de-
scribing the legislation at issue in Carolene Products as "an utterly unprincipled example of spe-
cial interest legislation").
75 I omit discussion of Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), the Court's most
recent takings case, because the majority did not purport to interpret the police power: they
reinterpreted the Takings Clause as requiring a public use. See id. at 2663 ("The disposition of
this case therefore turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a 'public
purpose.'"); id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the discussion of the police
power in Berman and Midkiff as "errant"). But cf KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OFJUDICIAL
ACTIVISM (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 135-36, on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law) (arguing that Kelo's public use requirement is really grounded in
the Due Process Clause). I also omit limitations created prior to Kelo. at least one federal court
and several states' highest courts have blocked the condemnation of private property for use by
other private parties. See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (blocking the condemnation of a 99 Cents store to make
room for the expansion of a neighboring Costco store because the condemnation involved "the
naked transfer of property from one private party to another"); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City
Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (111. 2002) (blocking condemnation of a metal recycling center
so that a racetrack could expand its parking lot because the condemnation violated both the
state and federal constitutions).
76 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
7 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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of eminent domain with the police power. Berman addressed the
constitutionality of a statute that allowed the condemnation of prop-
erty for redevelopment even if the property itself was not blighted,
and Midkiff addressed the constitutionality of a condemnation
scheme designed to break up a Hawaiian land oligopoly by transfer-
ring land from the owner oligopolies to their tenants. The proscrip-
tion against taking the property of one individual and granting it to
another has been announced and repeated in Supreme Court deci-
sions since almost the nation's founding. For example, in the 1798
case of Calder v. Bull, the Court stated that "a law that takes property
from A. and gives it to B." is invalid because it is "against all reason
and justice, for a people to entrust a legislature with SUCH powers.",7
8
Almost a century later, in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Nebraska, the
Court stated that the taking of private property from one person for
another's private use is not due process of law. 9 In Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka, the Court stated that there are "reservations of individual
rights" implied in the social contract such that no court could order
that the "homestead now owned by A. should no longer be his, but
should henceforth be the property of B."80 Further, the Court held
that using public bonds to help a private company establish bridges
was not a valid exercise of the police power, for "[t]o lay with one
hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen,
and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private
enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery
because it is done under the forms of law." '81 A government-forced
transfer of property from one party to another cuts against the pur-
pose of government.
Rather than enforcing a limit, the Court in both Berman and Mid-
kiff emphasized two related ideas: the broad conceptual scope of the
police power and the responsibility of the courts to defer to legislative
determinations on such matters. The Court in Berman gave this defi-
nition of the police power:
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each
case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product
of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete defini-
tion .... Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the tradi-
78 3 U.s. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
79 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
80 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874) (citations omitted).
81 Id. at 664.
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tional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they
merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.
s
2
The passage suggests that the police power is marked by proto-
typical examples, such as the protection of public health or safety. It
also recognizes the full, unbounded nature of the category. The po-
lice power resists definition precisely because it is graded: it is not
defined by necessary conditions and is not bounded by a single defi-
nition but has a whole range of members, some less central than oth-
ers. The Court's accompanying deference to the legislature suggests
that it recognizes the category of the police power as dependent on
the purposes of government and cedes the power to construct that
category to the legislature. The necessity of the acquisition of prop-
erty in Berman depends not on a judge's categories-it depends on
the demands of the public interest, as largely defined by the legisla-
ture. Berman seemed to recognize that the category of the police
power is purposive in the sense that its definition lies with the branch
charged with determining the ends of the government. Despite its
prototypes, the category is graded such that limiting the power of the
government to regulating only the most prototypical examples would
unnecessarily limit the legislature's power.
Midkiff relied on the rule in Berman and came to a similar conclu-
sion. After repeating Berman's rule, the Court concluded that once
the purpose of eliminating an oligopoly was found, the legislation was
not a naked transfer of wealth from one individual to another but in-
stead a classic use of the police power to eliminate oligopoly.83 Under
Berman and Midkiff judicial enforcement of limits is minimal and the
possibility of pretext exists: the Court's broad concept of the police
power allows legislatures to act for illegitimate purposes, unchecked
by the judiciary.
In sum, to protect its notion of liberty, the Lochner Court limited
the police power to certain prototypical exercises by employing a host
of categories, including whether something is sufficiently dangerous
or affected with a public interest, even if its distinctions would not
stand up to a close factual analysis. Later, the New Deal Court inter-
preted the scope of the police power to be as broad as the concept
would allow, including less prototypical examples that very well could
have been transfers of wealth to private parties. In addition, rather
than employing a category that would prevent the police power from
82 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). The passage up to the ellipsis was also quoted
in Midkiff 467 U.S. at 239.
83 See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241-42.
84 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2675 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and incidental public
benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing," such that it is difficult to ascertain
an illegitimate governmental purpose).
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being used as a pretext, the modern Court allows the legislature's
purpose to define the proper use of the police power.
B. The Commerce Clause: Or There and Back Again
5
In the Court's twentieth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
we see the same shift from categories created to limit the use of the
commerce power to prototypical activities to a broad, legislatively-
determined agenda. We then see a partial return to a more proto-
type-based understanding of what is economic.
The Constitution specifies that Congress has the power to "regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.""6
Under this grant, the pre-New Deal Court upheld legislation where
the regulated goods traveled in interstate travel and were harmful in
themselves but struck down legislation where the goods were harm-
less;s7 upheld regulation of commerce, but not manufacture; s8 upheld
regulation of activities that had a direct but not an indirect effect on• 89
interstate commerce; and upheld regulation of goods still in the
flow of commerce but not regulation at their destination. 0 The rea-
soning in support of these distinctions was again categorical and
somewhat conclusory. For example, in Carter v. Carter Coal,9' the
Court held that a coal tax was not valid under the Commerce Clause.
While the manufacture of coal may have a tremendous impact on the
country, the Court took the word "direct" to mean the "absence of an
efficient intervening agency or condition. 9 2 Under this theory, it did
not matter whether the impact on interstate commerce was great but
only how the effect occurred. 3 Congress could regulate a single lot-
tery ticket moving in interstate commerce but not the source of pro-
duction of tons of coal moving through the country. In limiting the
85 The subtitle comes from J.R.R. Tolkien's THE HOBBIT: ORTHERE AND BACKAGAIN (1936).
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating ban on products of
child labor from entering interstate commerce because the goods are harmless in themselves);
Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding federal ban on lottery
tickets in interstate commerce).
88 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (refusing to apply the
Sherman Antitrust Act to a trust that manufactured ninety-five percent of the United States'
sugar because the actual manufacture was intrastate).
89 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that labor conditions in the
coal industry have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce).
90 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (upholding regulation of cattle
stockyards because they are not a final destination).
91 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
92 Id. at 307-08.
93 Id. at 308 ("[Tlhat question is not-What is the extent of the local activity or condition, or
the extent of the effect produced upon interstate commerce? but-What is the relation between
the activity or condition and the effect?").
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power to regulate to direct effects, the Court hewed closely to an a
priori category and its prototype rather than allowing a fact-specific
inquiry. As the Court argued in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, a broad definition of the power to regulate commerce would
mean no limit to federal power, creating "for all practical pur-
poses ... a completely centralized government.
9 4
With NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steer5 and Wickard v. Filburn,9 6 the
Court collapsed its earlier distinctions. In Wickard, perhaps the
broadest expansion of the Commerce Power, the Court rejected the
mechanical application of prior tests like the direct/indirect effects
distinction. In finding that Congress could regulate the production
of wheat for home consumption, the Court stated that the "mechani-
cal application of legal formulas [is] no longer feasible." 97 The Court
reasoned that while the local nature of an activity can help determine
whether Congress intended to regulate it, ultimately even the trivial
production of home-grown wheat can influence the national econ-
omy.99 The Court in Wickard chose not to employ its categorical
analysis: instead, it allowed a largely fact-based analysis. This fact-
based analysis acknowledged the full conceptual range of what com-
merce may mean and largely ceded its control to Congress, despite
the possibility that Congress might abuse that power by acting for a
purpose other than commercial regulation. In Jones & Laughlin Steel,
in upholding a collective bargaining law the Court again emphasized
an unwillingness to apply a form of categorical reasoning: the Court
found the possibility of debilitating labor strife to be closely related to
interstate commerce" and warned against "shut[ting] our eyes to the
plainest facts of our national life and [dealing] with the question of
direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum."'' 0  As in the
later Wickard case, the Court seemed to criticize the categorical ap-
proach for its avoidance of economic reality in favor of its concepts:
the categorical approach seemed unable to accept factual findings or
alternative characterizations from the legislature. Thus, the Court
notes that "interstate commerce itself is a practical conception,"'01
that its jurisprudence should not "ignore actual experience,"00 and
that any judgment is "one of degree."' Rather than being defined a
94 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935).
95 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
96 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
97 Id. at 124.
98 Id. at 127-28.
% 301 U.S. at 41.
i00 Id.
101 Id. at 41-42.
102 Id. at 42.
103 Id. at 37.
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priori, the power granted by the Commerce Clause is defined by prac-
tical exigencies, involving questions of degree rather than principle.
Despite their lack of judicial protection, concerns regarding the
scope of government power were at least (and perhaps at most)
noted by the New Deal Court. For example, in Jones & Laughlin Steel,
the Court noted that the scope of the Commerce Power must "not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indi-
rect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex soci-
ety, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is na-
tional and what is local."1 4 This distinction may be important for a
variety of reasons. For example, perhaps a far-reaching power under
the Commerce Clause was never envisioned by the founders, even if
its text suggests such a broad scope;1 15 the Constitution created a dual
system of government accountability that requires that the federal
government not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
states; l10 and the federal system protects essential liberties so long as
there is a proper balance between the power of the state and local
governments.
In the modern cases, perhaps influenced by the belief that the
federal system must be judicially protected, the question of whether
an activity is truly economic seems to carry the day.108 In United States
v. Lopez, the Court ruled that a regulation forbidding the knowing
possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school exceeded the
Commerce Power.109 Lopez noted that Congress could regulate the
channels of interstate commerce, persons or things in interstate
commerce even if they have only an intrastate effect, and activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.1 Addressing the third
category, the Court emphasized the fact that the law in question did
not have anything to do with commerce or any sort of economic ac-
104 Id.
105 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125,
129-31 (noting the argument that the restriction of the Commerce Power in Lopez was neces-
sary to maintaining the limits on federal power envisioned by the founders).
106 Cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (describing the notion of proper respect for
state governments, "a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that that the National Government
will fare best if the States ... are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.").
107 Gregory v. Aschcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) ("In the tension between federal and state
power lies the promise of liberty.").
108 I say "seems to" because the Court is open to the criticism that it does not employ its test
consistently. See Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1699 (arguing that in Pierce County v. Guillen, 537
U.S. 129 (2003), the Court allowed regulation of non-commercial activity since the Court did
not believe that Congress was acting for pretextual ends).
109 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
110 Id. at 558-59.
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tivity."' The Court reasoned that because the regulation did not con-
cern a commercial activity, cases upholding regulations of activities
that are connected with a commercial transaction which viewed in
the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce were inappo-
site."' Like the Court's judgment in Lochner about the health effects
of baking," 3 the judgment that the regulation at issue had nothing to
do with commerce seems entirely conclusory. Perhaps the presence
of guns in schools has just as much effect on learning and therefore
on commerce as any activity legitimately regulated." However, the
Court rejected this argument, because otherwise, any activity could be
classified as economic: there would be no limit on federal power,
even in areas traditionally left to the states." 5
The Court's rationale stems from a truncation of the allowable
concept of what is economic, in favor of what is truly or more proto-
typically economic. This restriction is considered necessary to main-
taining a limited national government in a federal system. Certainly,
in one respect, this rule seems wrong: it should not matter whether
the Commerce Clause affects areas traditionally left to the states, for
example, as the scope of the Commerce Clause is plenary. 6 How-
ever, if we view the Court as limiting the commerce power in the be-
lief that this limitation is necessary for maintaining the federal sys-
tem, a different picture emerges. The Court must ignore the
economic impacts of guns in schools and restrict the scope of the
Commerce Clause to prototypical commercial activities so that the
judicial limit it imposes is not lost.
In United States v. Morrison,"l7 the Court ruled that the Commerce
Clause did not give Congress the power to enact the civil remedy pro-
vision of the Violence Against Women Act. The Morrison Court sug-
gested that the non-economic and traditionally local nature of the
statute was crucial in Lopez and in Morrison itself."8  In examining
findings regarding the economic impacts motivating the provision,
the Court stated that "Congress' findings are substantially weakened
I Id. at 561.
112 Id.
11 See supra Part II.A.
114 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he welfare of our
future 'Commerce...' is vitally dependent on the character of the education of our children.")
(citation omitted); id. at 620-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing empirical evidence support-
ing a conclusion that guns near schools have a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
See id. at 565.
16 See id. at 609 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("The suggestion is either that a connection between
commerce and these subjects is remote, or that the commerce power is simply weaker when it
touches subjects on which the States have historically been the primary legislators. Neither sug-
gestion is tenable.").
117 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
118 Id. at 610.
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by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we
have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Consti-
tution's enumeration of powers."" 9 The method of reasoning is a fac-
tual examination of the actual effects of an activity on commerce, and
the method is unworkable because it conflicts with the Court's cate-
gorically-implemented limitations.
The modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence exhibits the same
formalism as Lochner the restriction of governmental power to proto-
typical activities through a process of categorical reasoning that de-
nies empirical evidence of similarity or actual effect in order to main-
tain a constitutional norm. 1 2 Concern about pretext operates here as
well: it is very likely that Congress did not pass the anti-gun legisla-
tion in Lopez or the protections for women in Morrison because of
concern about the economy.121
In the police power and Commerce Clause areas, the legal stan-
dard follows from a particular method of thought that is categorically
based on prototypes, rather than constitutional text alone. 12  hile
positively satisfying, this suggests also that the Court's reasoning does
not necessarily mirror any intended meaning to the Constitution.
This idea will be explored in the next section in the area of modern
substantive due process and renewed in the last section on the theo-
retical implications of this analysis.
C. Categorization and Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process has proven historically persistent 12 3 and a
matter of continuing contention with regard to its premise.124 While
119 Id.
120 See supra Part II.A.
12I Frank Goodman, Preface, The Supreme Court's Federalism, Real or Imagined?, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 9, 17-18 (2001) (suggesting that Lopez and Morrison place activities out-
side Congress's power for reasons other than their effect on interstate commerce).
122 The Necessary and Proper Clause may complicate this analysis. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125
S. Ct. 2195, 2218 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Where necessary to make a regulation of in-
terstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.").
123 Cf James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive
Due Process, 16 CONST. CoMm. 315, 318 (1999) (noting that as early as the antebellum era, some
judges understood due process as having substantive content); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 757-64 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (tracing the persistent notion of due process
rights from the natural rights tradition, through the Lochner era, to the modem day).
14 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing as
inconsistent the majority's decision to invalidate an anti-sodomy statute without announcing a
fundamental right to homosexual sodomy); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 115
(1990) (criticizing Roe because "the opinion seems to regard the constitutional grounding of
the right to privacy as a technicality that really does not matter, and indeed it does not, since
the right does not come out of the Constitution but is forced into it.");John Hart Ely, The Wages
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this description does not intend to compare the varying approaches
to substantive due process,' 25 it does show that the same kind of cate-
gorical reasoning seen in the Commerce Clause and police power ar-
eas takes place here.
In its early privacy rights decisions, the Court employed a form of
categorical reasoning based on making specific constitutional provi-
sions stand for general concepts and simply stating that an asserted
right fell within that category. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,
the Court invalidated a regulation forbidding the use of contracep-
tives to prevent conception as applied to married individuals because
the marital relationship was within a zone of privacy created by vari-
ous constitutional guarantees. 26 The Court explained that its First
Amendment cases protected various peripheral rights necessary to
make the right meaningful, including a right to read, teach, and as-
sociate freely, while other constitutional guarantees like the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments created a zone of privacy.127 The Court
then concluded that the marital relationship falls "within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.' 28
Here the Court constructed a general category from the specific pro-
visions. The Court's statement of breadth was unsupported by ex-
plicit reasoning; that said, the Court may rightly assume that readers
can accept that things seem to belong to categories without explicit
argument.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court again listed constitutional protections
before deciding that, whether based on the Ninth Amendment or the
Fourteenth, the right of privacy is "broad enough" to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.' The
Court understood the categories of the Constitution as graded and
encompassing a broad range of rights. 30 Justice Blackmun's dissent
of Cying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing the Lochner-esque
use of substantive due process in Roe v. Wade).
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(suggesting an incremental approach that balances individual interests against that of the
state); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-26 (1989) (describing the asserted liberty in-
terest as narrowly as possible when determining whether an asserted interest is protected by the
Due Process Clause); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting two lines of privacy rights, one in regard to decisions that form a central part
of one's life and another based on the primacy of the home); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (identifying rights protected by substantive due process by looking
to traditions that are deeply rooted in the nation's history).
126 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
127 Id. at 482-83.
128 Id. at 485.
129 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
130 Todd Brower suggests something similar in "A Stranger to Its Laws": Homosexuality, Schemas,
and the Lessons and Limits of Reasoning by Analogy, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65 (1997). Brower
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in Bowers v. Hardwick illustrates this point: it attempts to create a de-
cisional and locational privacy right, based on case-law and various
constitutional amendments, that is broad enough to encompass a
right to homosexual sodomy. 3' The Court's seemingly conclusory
reasoning involves the same methods employed in earlier eras-the
purposeful use of categories to enforce substantive values and not-
fully-declarative categorical resemblances.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court did not identify a fundamental
right to homosexual sodomy, but it did hold that the state could not
"demean [the petitioners'] existence" by criminalizing their private
sexual conduct. .2 Some commentators have suggested that the Court
in Lawrence was reluctant to announce any new fundamental right. 1
33
Even absent Griswolds explicitly categorical reasoning, Lawrence is
equally conclusory in its statement of rights and equally motivated by
policy concerns, namely, the desire to protect certain areas from state
interference, especially where exercise of liberty is important to an
individual and works little ostensible harm on the state.14
The modern substantive due process jurisprudence sometimes dif-
fers from the police power and Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
that it more explicitly acknowledges the policy aspects of its decisions.
The Court sometimes takes into account the permissible purposes of
government and balances individual liberty against the demands of
organized society, 135 as opposed to ceding the task entirely to the leg-
islature 36 or creating a category for a priori reasoning. 37 For example,
as contended in the amicus brief of prominent philosophers in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg,13s the Court's emphasis on protection of the
power to make important life decisions and order one's conception
of existence does seem to extend a fortiori to one of the most impor-
suggests that the Court is really comparing claimed fundamental rights to prototypical funda-
mental rights. Id. at 76.
131 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-07 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
132 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The State cannot demean their existence or control their des-
tiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.").
133 See, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1906 (2004) (making such an argument).
1 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (the Due Process Clause guarantees "'a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter'") (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
135 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (quotingJustice Harlan's statement that due process "'represent[s]
the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society.'") (quoting Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
IM See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (describing this tendency with regard to the
Court's modern police power jurisprudence).
17 See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text (describing this tendency with regard to the
Court's Lochner-era jurisprudence).
138 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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tant decisions a person can make-the circumstances under which
one leaves this life.'" However, the practical realities and dangers of
protecting such a right seem to militate against protection, even if it
is squarely within the superordinate category.
That said, for at least two reasons, the fact that modern substan-
tive due process cases contain explicit policy balancing whereas the
Commerce Clause and police power cases do not is a distinction
without a difference. First, as already noted, the Griswold line is often
just as conclusory as the Court's holdings in the police power and
Commerce Clause contexts. 1 Second, the Court's Commerce Clause
and police power cases sometimes do involve policy balancing that is
at odds with what their categorical test would otherwise seem toS 142
mandate. To the extent that modern substantive due process in-
volves an explicit balancing of personal and governmental interests,
this is perhaps the abandonment of a trope, not necessarily a marked
change in practice.
In sum, the categorical perspective suggests that rather than being
an unprincipled usurpation or extratextual interpretation, the mod-
ern substantive due process cases involve just another form of cate-
gorical reasoning, employed in an effort to protect perceived (and
contested) constitutional values.
III. ON SAYING WHAT THE LAW Is
The graded, purpose-driven, not-fully-declarative nature of our
categories can descriptively explain the Court's jurisprudence in the
police power, Commerce Clause, and modern substantive due proc-
ess areas. Rather than being conclusory statements, the early Com-
merce Clause and police power cases seem to turn on prototypical al-
lowable uses, created to judicially maintain substantive constitutional
values. These are sometimes replaced by a notion of the category as
graded and partially determined by the purposes of government and
by an accompanying license to allow legislatures to define these pur-
poses.
139 Anicus Brief in Support of Respondents Submitted by Ronald Dworkin et. al., Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 1996 IL 708956, at *3-4.
140 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782 (SouterJ., concurring) (finding the state's asserted interest
in protecting patients from involuntary euthanasia dispositive).
141 This is not to suggest that substantive due process jurisprudence does not suffer this same
flaw. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 133, at 1904 (noting that the intimate decision involved in Law-
rence involved a fleeting sexual encounter).
142 See, e.g., supra note 66.
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A. Categories as Enforcing Normative Limits
For the past century, judges in these areas have been defining the
law in ways that match a judicial method of looking at the world: us-
ing categories and resemblances rather than factual determinations
to see whether a right should be upheld or a regulation struck down.
The Constitution, as judicially enforced, does not specify an outcome
in these areas. Rather the Constitution at most specifies broad cate-
gories whose less prototypical examples may be treated differently
depending on the Court's view of the need to protect other constitu-
tional values from interference, for example, individual liberties in
the police power jurisprudence, dual federalism in the Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, or personal privacy in the Griswold line.
This paper suggests no best way to go about solving the tension
between the broad powers of modern government and the perceived
need for constitutional limits. However, a good starting point is the
Court's concerns-the need to enforce limits due to the danger of
legislatures acting under an illegitimate pretext or exceeding the
constitutional bounds of their authority. This is consistent with the
notion that the Court should step in only where Congress cannot be
trusted to protect basic constitutional values,143 be it a base-line of in-
dividual rights, federalism, or private decisional autonomy. Given the
Court's reasoning in the areas discussed, structuralism, originalism,
intentionalism, and so on seem rather shallow or at least just a first
step: perhaps the Constitution's structure provides some guidance as
to what values must be enforced, but these are broad, normative val-
ues that have been implemented via judicially-created categorical lim-
its.
Using these categorical limits, the Court's decisions are weakest
where they should be strongest. They do not adequately justify the
nature and source of the values at stake, as in the modern Commerce
Clause and the Griswold line, beyond an ipse dixit about limits or the
breadth of protection. If the greatest justification for restricting a
category is fear of pretext or a desire to create a substantive limit, as it
appears to be, then this analysis should carry most of the conceptual
weight; proclamations regarding category membership should not be
relied on. l" These proclamations perhaps enhance the perception
that the Court lays down the law according to constitutional princi-
ples, as opposed to implementing somewhat vague constitutional
policies. However, assuming reason and reasons are the measure of
143 Cf ELY, supra note 43, at 183 ("[C]onstitutional law appropriately exists for those situa-
tions where representative government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can.").
144 Roosevelt, for example, lists various considerations the Court could consider in deciding
what decision rule to adopt, including enforcement costs. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1658-67.
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judicial opinions, the Court's legitimacy is at most a secondary con-
sideration.
There is an equalizing force to this analysis. If scholars and judges
engage in attacks about similarity to canonical cases (being canonical
for good or bad reasons), Lochner, Lopez, and Roe are all equally open
to attack. That they feature similarly categorical, seemingly conclu-
sory reasoning is a charge against all of these cases, rather than just
one of them.
B. Categories as a Judicial Implementation
Areas like the modern Commerce Clause cases suggest that the
category is a judicial creation based on what the Court sees as proto-
typical, as opposed to a fact about the Constitution itself, just as areas
like the modern police power seem relatively unbounded from the
judicial perspective compared to their possible content. This is com-
patible with the view that the Court fashions rules of decision, rather
than simply specifying constitutional content.
1 45
Ultimately, conceptualizing constitutional law as an a priori, cate-
gorical interpretative process unveils a broad horizon of constitu-
tional meaning.1 46 The judicially enforced constitutional limit is not
defined by the Constitution but by the Court's categories. As sug-
gested by the legislatively-designed purposes in the police power,
Commerce Clause, and modern substantive due process cases, this
conception is not necessarily a single correct one but one that is
adapted to the means and ends of its users-courts enforcing the law.
This complicates the debate over the role of non-judicial actors in
the construction of constitutional meaning. Commentators have
urged a stronger role for non-judicial actors in the construction of
constitutional meaning.1 47 The Court is not necessarily the 1primary
arbiter of constitutional meaning: the public,1 48 Congress, or the
President 5° should perhaps play a more robust role.
15 See Sager, supra note 6, passim (arguing that there are areas where the Supreme Court has
refused to enforce a provision to its full conceptual boundaries due to institutional concerns);
Berman, supra note 6, passim (surveying the utility of this distinction in other areas). See gener-
ally FALLON, supra note 6 (surveying different methods of constitutional theory in light of their
potential to implement its content).
146 See Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1718 (noting the interpretative room left by the fact that the
Court's decisions do not specify the exact content of the Constitution). Cf Berman, supra note
6, at 16 (suggesting that while citizens preparing for litigation should abide by the Court's deci-
sions, the meaning of the Constitution could have a greater operative role to play in constitu-
tional discourse).
147 See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2001).
148 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 147.
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An objection to taking the Constitution outside the courts is that
certain kinds of extra-judicial constitutional interpretation don't
mesh with our notion of the Constitution as ordinary law.'5' But what
the Court decides isn't always exactly law either, in the sense in which
we often employ the term. The Court is acting to enforce general
limits on government in an a priori, categorical fashion to create some
kind of substantive limits, not specifying any "true" content to the
Constitution by comparing a statute to the Constitution as if it were
laying the documents side-by-side. Moreover, in the areas described,
the Court's results are not determinate in an ordinary law kind of way
or indeterminate, per Hart's sense of open texture-the Court con-
structs limits based on concerns about pretext. It does not divine the
purpose of a particular provision in the way a court would interpret
an open-textured statute"' but bases its decisions on broader, largely
unexplored concerns about pretext and limits. In fact, these unsub-
stantiated concerns about pretext and limits seem just as ethereal or
willowy as Tushnet's vision of populist constitutional law and its thin
Constitution, which guarantees not specific textual rights but broad
fundamentals like equality, freedom of expression, and liberty.153
There may nonetheless be reasons to treat the Court's resolution
of issues as binding law-for example, that such treatment provides a
necessary settlement function that Congress cannot provide 54 or that
our governmental system compels Congress to respect judicially-
enforced limits designed with Congress in mind. However, it would
be an error to view the Court's resolution of constitutional issues, at
149 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARxV. L. REv. 153 (1997) (arguing that Congress should have a more robust
power of constitutional interpretation with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment).
1 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 220 (1994) ("Perhaps most important of all, the President has, as a
logical incident of his textually specified powers, the ancillary power of Judgment: the formi-
dable power to interpret the laws he is charged with executing and (sometimes) that he has had
a role in making.").
151 TUSHNET, supra note 147, at x ("The most problematic term here is law. How can consti-
tutional decisions made away from the courts, particularly by ordinary citizens, be law?") .
152 Hart notes that an individual interpreting an open-textured statute looks to the purposes
of the statute and criteria of relevance and closeness of resemblance. See HART, supra note 15,
at 124.
153 See TUSHNET, supra note 147, at 11 (contrasting the thick, judicially constructed Constitu-
tion with the thin, populist one).
154 See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST.
COMM. 455, 477-78 (2000) (arguing that the Court is institutionally superior to the political
branches at settling constitutional questions); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extra-
judicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1997) (describing the value
possessed by settled rules independent of their content). But see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 234-35 (2004) (arguing that
the Court does not necessarily settle constitutional issues any better than Congress would).
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least in the areas described, as resolving the meaning of the Constitu-
tion itself. r' 5
CONCLUSION
The Court's seemingly conclusory categorical reasoning in its po-
lice power, Commerce Clause, and modern substantive due process
areas does not specify the exact content of the Constitution but the
realities of its judicial enforcement. The Court may choose to ac-
knowledge that a legal category is graded and cede the power of gov-
ernment entirely to the legislature, as occurred in the modern police
power and post-New Deal Commerce Clause areas. It may instead
hew to a specific conception of a category, so as to judicially protect a
constitutional value from infringement by the legislature, especially
where it is likely that the legislature acts for pretextual reasons. As
seen in the modern substantive due process cases, the Court can also
create broad categories that may subsume purported rights.
The nature of how we reason about categories can deepen our
understanding of these lines of jurisprudence. The Court will invent
or use existing categories such as whether an activity is dangerous or
commercial and adhere to its categories even if the facts might allow
that baking 156 may be dangerous like mining 15' or that guns near
schools 158 have a greater effect on interstate commerce than home-
grown wheat159 out of a concern for creating substantive limits. The
categories are necessarily graded, with the Court's method of enforc-
ing the scope of the categories varying according to its concerns
about substantive limits. These categories are purposive: they are
tools for creating these limits. Finally, these categories are not fully
declarative; the Court's reasoning may still be sensible without de-
clarative explanation.
155 This is somewhat contrary to the Court's understanding of its job. See, e.g., City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (stating that if Congress determined the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment, then "what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any
meaningful sense, the 'provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]'") (alteration in original);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936) ("When an act of Congress is appropriately
challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of
the government has only one duty, to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All
the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question.").
16 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hour legislation for
bakers, partially because baking is not a dangerous enough activity).
157 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding a similar regulation for miners).
158 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that federal statute criminalizing
possession of a firearm within a school zone did not regulate economic activity).
159 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the power to regulate interstate
commerce extends to limiting production of home-grown wheat).
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Pretending that courts are specifying the content of the Constitu-
tion and debating about how they should discover it seems silly in
these areas. The Court in these areas does not specify the content of
the Constitution so much as use concepts restricted to their most cen-
tral meanings to create limits on governmental power, as it did in the
recent Commerce Clause and early twentieth-century police power
areas; conversely, it can also expand categories to create limits, as it
did in Griswold and Roe. This reinforces the notion that the Court
does not fully enforce the content of the Constitution and situates
the Court's holdings as resulting from its institutional position and a
certain form of a priori reasoning rather than the meaning of the
Constitution standing alone.
